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DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:




T HE invitation to this Symposium described the "concern over
the backlog in our courts and the high costs to litigants for full-
scale trials" and mentioned that alternative means of dispute resolu-
tion have become a "timely subject to the legal community."' Others
have described the potential of alternative means of dispute resolu-
tion in similar terms:
Society cannot and should not rely exclusively on the
courts for the resolution of disputes. Other mechanisms
may be superior in a variety of controversies. They may be
less expensive, faster, less intimidating, more sensitive to dis-
putants' concerns, and more responsive to underlying
problems. They may dispense better justice, result in less
alienation, produce a feeling that a dispute was actually
heard, and fulfill a need to retain control by not handing
the dispute over to lawyers, judges, and the intricacies of the
legal system. 2
There is no question but that a great deal of attention is currently
being paid to dispute resolution - finding ways of resolving our dif-
ferences outside of (or perhaps along side of) the courts - both as a
way of providing relief to the courts and as a way of reaching more
satisfactory decisions.
Interestingly, it also seems customary to describe the purpose of
many administrative programs and the accompanying process as pro-
viding a more responsive, flexible means by which society's decisions
can be made.3 Trials before agencies were supposed to be less cum-
t A.B., Kenyon College, 1964; M.A., University of Michigan, 1966; J.D., Uni-
versity of Michigan, 1969.
1. Letter from J. Gordon Cooney, Jr., Editor-in-Chief, Villanova Law Review
to Philip J. Harter (Aug. 10, 1983) (invitation to participate in 1984 Law Review
Symposium).
2. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUS-
TICE, PATHS TO JUSTICE: MAJOR PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
(1984).
3. See B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 3 (1976). Thus, for example, ad-
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bersome, less expensive, and less time consuming than courtroom
hearings. 4 Rulemaking was seen as a way of filling in the details of
legislation or responding to particular needs in an easy, quickly exe-
cuted manner as opposed to the vagaries of legislation or using trials
to develop policy through the common law. Throughout this process,
the courts were to ensure that the action taken was not arbitrary or
capricious, and certainly within the bounds of legality, but other than
that they were to accommodate the agencies' decisions. 5
It seems equally clear that the administrative process has now
become part of the problem. Programs founded to be responsive have
become laborious, unyielding, and repressive. The process itself is
"increasingly being criticized for being unduly costly, cumbersome
and slow." 6 These problems arose n6 doubt in part through bureau-
cratic momentum and an effort to protect past values. But, they also
arose from quite appropriate responses to very real difficulties.
It therefore seems incumbent on those of us who are interested in
the administrative process and in improving the way we make deci-
sions affecting each other to be vigilant to see if there are ways of
ministrative agencies were to address and redress problems created by or beyond the
reach of the courts. One commentator explained that the definition of an "agency"
in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) "equates the agency with the executive
branch." Id; see Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1982).
The APA defines an "agency" as:
[Ejach authority of the Government of the United States whether or
not it is within or subject to review by another agency, but does not in-
clude-
(A) the Congress;
(B) the courts of the United States;
(C) the governments of the territories or possessions of the United
States;
(D) the government of the District of Columbia.
5 U.S.C. § 551(1)(A)-(D) (1982).
4. See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 194-214 (3d ed. 1972)
(describing the adjudication procedures used by agencies) [hereinafter cited as DAVIS
TEXT]; B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 263-327 (discussing the fair hearing require-
ments which are applied to agencies). In addition to being less expensive and less
time consuming, the rules of procedure and evidence were to be tailored to achieve
justice and economy. See generally 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 102, at 308-09 (1979) (discussing "fair informal procedure" as a more accurate de-
scription for agency action currently referred to as "adjudication") [hereinafter cited
as DAVIS TREATISE].
5. See Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). The APA
directs the reviewing court to "hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings,
and conclusions found to be ...arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law." Id; see generay 1 DAVIS TREATISE, supra note
4, at § 6:6 (discussing judicial review of agency rules and the effect of that review on
the agency's choice of a rulemaking procedure).
6. Announcement of ABA Section of Administrative Law, Consensus as an Al-
ternative to the Adversarial Process (program held September 30, 1983).
1394 [Vol. 29: p. 1393
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aligning the difficult balance of providing appropriate safeguards
while reestablishing the original promise of administrative law.7
The review of the administrative process may be particularly
pertinent to a general discussion of dispute resolution because it arose
to meet a need in dispute resolution. In addition, as its processes
evolved and matured, it had to struggle - and is struggling - to
define its relationship to the courts. Thus, the "institutionalization" 8
of dispute resolution may learn much from the administrative pro-
cess, and in turn the administrative process can profitably draw on
the insights we are gaining on various forms of dispute resolution.
To put the complex relationship of dispute resolution and the
administrative process into perspective, it is helpful to look at its his-
tory, the current needs, and the future.
II. HISTORY OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. Estabishment of Programs
Many administrative agencies, the programs they administer,
and individual regulations they issue can be explained, at least some-
what, by a dissatisfaction with existing mechanisms for resolving
either rights or interest disputes.9 The response has been the creation
of agencies that are designed to alter the substantive rights of the af-
fected parties and supplant judicial processes with an administrative
one that, it is hoped, will better fulfill the goals of the program. Con-
sider five examples:
1. National Labor Relations Act (Act).t1 Traditional legal
concepts and doctrines, such as criminal prosecutions alleging con-
spiracy or application of antitrust laws to union organizing, which
were applied by the courts to labor relations led to broad dissatisfac-
tion with the resulting antiunion or antiself-help holdings. I The re-
sult was the passage of the National Labor Relations Act that is
administered by the National Labor Relations Board (Board). The
7. For discussion of the appropriate balance between safeguards and responsive-
ness, see notes 31-32 and accompanying text infra.
8. That seems an unfortunate term for the long run establishment of dispute
resolution programs. While "establishment" has an aura of success about it, institu-
tionalization sounds like a commitment to the local mental hospital. Nonetheless,
that appears to be accepted terminology.
9. Perritt, 'And the Whole Earth Was of One Language"--A Broad View of Dispute
Resolution, 29 VILL. L. REv. 1221 (1984).
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1982).
11. Much of the following analysis applies to regulatory programs that are
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Act itself gave rise to substantive rights of organization that were pre-
viously denied, and the Board was to be an expert body that would
be sympathetic to the cause of the rights of employees to organize and
bargain collectively. 12 Moreover, a piece of the prolabor legislation'3
barred courts from interfering with this policy by issuing injunctions
based on the traditional doctrines. 14 Thus, there was substantive dis-
satisfaction with the state of the law as administered by the courts, so
it was changed. There was also dissatisfaction with the bias that
judges were reflecting and so a new, more sympathetic forum was
created to hear the disputes that arose.
2. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). On first blush,
the failure of dispute resolution would seem to have little to do with
the Clean Air Act, 15 the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 16 or
any of the other statutes that EPA administers.17 If those who live
12. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). The Act was passed to protect "by law the right
of employees to organize and bargain collectively," and as a result safeguard "com-
merce from injury, impairment, or interruption." Id.
13. The Norris-LaGuardia Act "declared it to be the public policy of the United
States that employees be permitted to organize and bargain collectively free of em-
ployer coercion and sought to achieve that goal by regulating and in most cases bar-
ring altogether the issuance of injunctions in a 'labor dispute.' " R. GORMAN, BASIC
TEXT ON LABOR LAW 4 (1976); see 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-110, 113-115 (1982).
14. R. GORMAN, supra note 13, at 4; see generally A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW 55-60 (9th ed. 1981) (a general discussion of
some of the traditional doctrines upon which injunctions were based prior to the
Norris-LaGuardia Act).
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982). The Clean Air Act "regulates industrial air
pollution by two distinct methods: air quality control and emission control." R.
ZENER, GUIDE TO FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1 (1981).
16. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982); see generally R. ZENER, supra note 15, at 59-
124 (an in-depth discussion of water pollution control legislation).
17. The analysis that follows applies generally to regulatory programs that ad-
dress "externalities." See S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 23-26 (1982); I.
MILLSTEIN & S. KATSH, THE LIMITS OF CORPORATE POWER 138-42 (1981). It also
applied to those regulatory areas known as "preclearance," although not as well. See
generally I. MILLSTEIN & S. KATSH, supra, at 142-43 (preclearance regulation requires
agency approval before product is marketed). It would apply, for example, to the
safety and efficacy of pharmaceuticals, since an expeditious means of resolving dis-
agreements would internalize costs of mistakes and other problems. For that argu-
ment to work, one must assume the firm will anticipate the adverse consequences
that would flow from marketing a dangerous drug and hence would conduct the
optimal amount of testing to ensure its reasonable safety (and anticipating the need
to get it on the market to meet a legitimate need). Not surprisingly, some people are
repulsed by the notion that some individuals would pay with their lives to provide
the information on hazards, and hence they argue in favor of a regulatory system
that anticipates risks and seeks to prevent unreasonable risks before the drug is mar-
keted. Even in that case, the dispute resolution theory might apply to the efficacy of
drugs which are now regulated by the Food and Drug Administration. There is an
extensive debate over whether the anticipatory regulation may actually lead to more
deaths and serious illness than would the dispute resolution model. See, e.g., Roberts
& Bodenheimer, The Drug Amendments of 1962. The Anatomy of a Regulato, Failure, 1982
1396 [Vol. 29: p. 1393
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around a plant that is polluting the air or water had a responsive,
inexpensive means of enforcing a "right" ' to clean air or water and
recovering damages from the offending plant, the costs of the pollu-
tion would be internalized and the company would be forced to make
an economic choice between paying and polluting or cleaning up.
That choice would be enforced better than the EPA is likely able to
do because those affected would presumably have a greater incentive
- and appropriate knowledge - to bring an action. Moreover, the
choice would likely be more nearly economically optimal since the
costs would be distributed more precisely than is possible in com-
mand-and-control regulation.19 Thus, under this system there would
be no externalities to necessitate or justify regulation. But, of course,
such a system does not exist: there is no direct, inexpensive, accurate
system for internalizing those costs. Doing so would be wildly expen-
sive and time consuming so that, as a result, the costs of pollution are
borne by the neighbors. As a result of what has been perceived as a
misallocation, the regulatory program was created that prohibits cer-
tain conduct altogether as a means of internalizing the costs. More-
over, a central agency is called upon to enforce its proscriptions.
Sometimes that is because the beneficiaries - the neighbors in this
case - still could not afford to enforce their new rights; and in other
cases they could afford to do so, in which case the regulated company
urges the limitation as a way of raising barriers to dispute resolution
and hence warding off payments (be they accurate or not)30
3. Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Several of the FTC's
rules appear to be based, in fact if not as the stated purpose, squarely
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 581, 612-13 (recommending informal dispute resolution to expedite
new drug approval process).
18. That "right" could be created by statute and administered by the elusive
dispute resolution mechanism, or it could evolve from a "common law" response.
There are several ways of altering the resolution of competing interests. The point
here is the need for a functioning mechanism to resolve the disputes that would arise
once the interests were identified.
19. Command-and-control is a type of regulation in which the agency "re-
quire[s] or proscribels] specific conduct by regulated firms." Stewart, Regulation, Inno-
vation, and Administrative Law. A Conceptual Framework, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1256, 1264
(1981). The regulating body enforces the commands with controls such as "orders,
injunctions, civil penalties, and criminal fines." Id.
20. Note that disputes over whether the Clean Air Act and its implementing
regulations have been violated are resolved by a court, not before the agency itself.
See 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (1982). Given that it has become commonplace to have agen-
cies themselves conduct hearings on whether the duties they impose have been met,
this may well have reflected a concern on the part of business that the agency itself
would be biased in favor of finding a violation and that it could receive a fairer, more
impartial hearing before a court. That is certainly the history of the separation of the
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission from the Occupational Safety
Health Administration, which issues the standards and citations for their violation.
1983-84] 1397
5
Harter: Dispute Resolution and Administrative Law: The History, Needs, an
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1984
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
on the Commission's belief that existing dispute resolution mecha-
nisms are inadequate to redress what it perceived to be a problem.
For example, if it were not so expensive and difficult to prosecute
common law or statutory fraud cases, the Commission's regulation of
vocational schools 2' would make little sense. In order to prevent this
pattern of fraud more effectively, the Commission prescribed specific
rules the schools must meet. 22 The violation of these rules was then a
violation of a duty owed to the FTC; and the Commission would en-
force the rule against the errant school. Thus, as a result of the failure
of a ready means for seeking redress, specific duties were created and
the aggrieved party was changed from the individual to the Commis-
sion. Interestingly, the student was left in about the same position as
before: without recourse other than complaining to the Commission
which might or might not take action. 23 The FTC's rules on
franchises24 are similar.
4. Workers Compensation. 25 Worker compensation programs
were in fact established because of dissatisfaction with the tort system
for compensating injured employees. The programs created new
rights that overrode the existing substantive law and were to be ad-
ministered by an agency. Disagreements are resolved not in courts -
at least in the first instance - but before the agencies themselves.
The process was likely envisioned as a mix of bureaucratic justice, in
which expert desk officers make the initial decisions, and a more judi-
cial-like, but nonetheless sympathetic, forum resolves remaining dis-
putes.26 Only after that were courts invoked. Again, the lack of a
21. The FTC established regulations with which proprietary vocational and
home study schools had to comply to avoid committing unfair and deceptive acts.
See 16 C.F.R. § 438 (1984). The purpose of this rule was "to alleviate currently abu-
sive practices" such as "unfair and deceptive advertising sales, and enrollment prac-
tices engaged in by some of the schools." Katharine Gibbs School, Inc. v. FTC, 612
F.2d 658, 661 (2d Cir. 1979) (quoting 43 Fed. Reg. 60,795-817 (1978)).
The FTC's rule was held invalid in 1979 because the regulation treated viola-
tions of the FTC's " 'requirements prescribed for the purpose of preventing' unfair
practices as themselves the unfair practices." Id. at 662.
22. See 16 C.F.R. § 438 (1984).
23. The existence of the rule might, of course, alter the student's bargaining
power in informal negotiations with the school. The student is not, however, pro-
vided the right to enforce the duty created by the rule in any forum that can issue a
binding order. The rule required that the school include specific rights in its contract
with students, and those rights would presumably be enforceable by the student
through civil litigation; if the required clauses were omitted, however, it would ap-
pear that enforcement would remain solely with the FTC. See id.
24. See 16 C.F.R. § 436 (1984).
25. A similar analysis would apply to Social Security Disability, Black Lung, or
Railroad Retirement programs.
26. For a thorough discussion of the mix of bureaucratic and judicial justice in
Social Security disability cases, see J. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE (1983).
1398 [Vol. 29: p. 1393
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sympathetic, responsive forum led to the creation of an administra-
tive program.
5. Toxic Torts.2 7 The enormous amount of litigation, both
before courts and in workers compensation programs, over occupa-
tional exposure to asbestos and the current concern over illness result-
ing from exposure to toxic materials2 8 has led to proposals for the
creation of new agencies, or the adaption of existing ones, to deal with
the problem. 29 Some commentators have suggested that an agency
could process disputes over whether a particular illness is sufficiently
linked to a substance as to impose liability on its manufacturer. 30
Other authorities have suggested that an agency could develop infor-
mation and presumptions that would be used in processing future
claims and disputes.
In sum, many regulatory programs are created to rectify a per-
ceived market imperfection 3 1 that may in fact reflect an inability to
resolve substantive disputes appropriately. That is, some people are
regarded as "victims" because they lack the redress that would be
necessary for their rights and duties to be properly aligned with the
rights and duties of others. The response, then, is the creation of an
administrative program that both alters the substantive relationships
and provides a built-in dispute resolution mechanism under more
sympathetic procedures. 3 2
The lesson in all of this is simply that dispute resolution and reg-
ulation are closely related. We therefore need to consider both how
27. For a review of the problems in the area of toxic torts, see Seventeenth Annual
Symposium, Toxic Torts: Judicial and Legislative Responses, 28 VILL. L. REV. 1083 (1983);
Comment, 28 VILL. L. REV. 1298 (1983).
28. See Schwartz & Means, The Need for Federal Product Liability and Toxic Tort
Legislation: A Current Assessment, 28 VILL. L. REv. 1088 (1983).
29. See id. at 1109-15.
30. This rather awkward way of saying (or, rather, avoiding saying) causation, is
in recognition of the difficulty in establishing "causation" in any rigorous sense under
traditional tort law. The diseases may become manifest decades after exposure, have
multiple etiologies, and also have a significant background incidence. Thus, ascrib-
ing a particular disease to a particular event (even one continuing over a period of
time) may be impossible under the best of circumstances, and even more so given the
frequent lack of data. As a result, a new form of resolving the question of illnesses
that are attributed to exposure to toxic materials has been advocated. Some com-
mentators have also been opposed on the ground that the uncertainty would be inap-
propriately resolved in favor of excessive recovery. The debate will likely be one of
the lively political debates of the year. See Kircher, Federal Product Legislation and Toxic
Torts.: The Defense Perspective, 28 VILL. L. REV. 1116, 1119-31 (1983).
31. This theory may not apply to regulatory programs that are designed to cure
failure of competition. See I. MILLSTEIN & S. KATSH, supra note 17, at 132-46.
32. Some programs are, of course, enforced in courts, or by other existing means.
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to improve dispute resolution and whether a regulatory program is
needed to cure some perceived social ill. Lack of sensitivity to that
link may result in dysfunctional overkill that will actually hurt in the
long run. Moreover, one needs to be sensitive to the history of admin-
istrative programs when looking at the institutionalization of new
forms of dispute resolution: perhaps the appropriate response is not a
new form of dispute resolution but the creation of an agency; or, con-
trariwise, perhaps in some cases the experience will indicate the na-
ture of future problems that are likely to arise.
B. Admizistrative Procedure
While new administrative programs were being created during
the 1920's and 1930's to provide new rights, greater flexibility, and
more responsiveness to new situations, efforts were simultaneously be-
ing made to use the procedure by which they operated to confine the
exercise of the new powers to that explicitly granted by Congress. 33
Moreover, many of the programs that were developed during this pe-
riod required quite formal proceedings for developing rules and oper-
ated through formal processes. 34 Congress passed a bill in 193935 that
would codify this approach generally, only to have it vetoed by Presi-
dent Roosevelt because it was too rigid. In language reminiscent of
that describing the need for alternative means of dispute resolution
and the problems with both courts and lawyers, President Roosevelt
pointed out his problems with the bill:
The administrative tribunal or agency has been
evolved in order to handle controversies arising under par-
ticular statutes. It is characteristic of these tribunals that
simple and nontechnical hearings take the place of court tri-
als and informal proceedings supersede rigid and formal
pleadings and processes ....
[A] large part of the legal profession[, however,] has
never reconciled itself to the existence of the administrative
tribunal. Many of them prefer the stately ritual of the
33. Stewart, The Reformation of American Admtnistrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV.
1669, 1671-73 (1975). Professor Stewart has explained the confines placed upon ad-
ministrative law as follows: "Coercive controls on private conduct must be author-
ized by the legislature, and, under the doctrine against delegation of legislative
power, the legislature must promulgate rules, standards, goals, or some 'intelligible
principle' to guide the exercise of administrative power." Id. at 1672 (footnote
omitted).
34. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, FI-
NAL REPORT 105-08 (1941).
35. Walter-Logan Bill, H.R. 6324, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940).
1400 [Vol. 29: p. 1393
8
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 6 [1984], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol29/iss6/6
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
courts, in which lawyers play the speaking parts, to the sim-
ple procedure of administrative hearings which a client can
understand and even participate in.3 6
Thus, there has been a tension in administrative procedure be-
tween those who desire a relatively formal process and those who de-
sire a more flexible process. While the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) codified some types of procedures, the battle over the adminis-
trative process continues. 37
The APA, unlike Gaul, is divided into two relatively distinct
camps: notice and comment rulemaking and hearings of some sort,
with an emphasis on formal, trial-type activities. 38 The rulemaking
section calls only for a notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal
Register, the receipt of comments from interested members of the pub-
lic, the consideration of "relevant" matters presented, and finally a
notice of the final rule along with a "concise general statement of [its]
basis and purpose." In fact, however, a far more comprehensive pro-
cedure was contemplated for rules of much substance.3 9 On the other
hand, intricate and complex procedures are spelled out for adjudica-
tion and formal rulemaking.40
But in fact these two models are only the poles of a continuum of
procedures. 41 There is more, and it is complicated. The two models
do not recognize 42 some of the important variations of the adminis-
trative process that have arisen in the past twenty years during the
enormous growth of the administrative state.
For example, is a permit issued by the EPA under any of the
several statutes it administers a rule or an adjudication? 43 What
36. 86 CONG. REC. 13,942-43 (1940).
37. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Curefor Malaise, 71 GEo. L.J. 1, 2-18 (1982).
38. For example, the APA first defines a "rule." 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1982). An
"order" is then defined as "the whole or part of a final disposition . . . of an agency
in a matter other than rule making but including licensing." Id § 551(6). "Adjudica-
tion" is in turn defined as the "process for the formulation of an order." Id. § 551(7).
Thus, the world is divided into two parts: rules and orders, and the correlative proce-
dure is either rulemaking or adjudication.
39. Harter, supra note 37, at 9-10.
40. 5 U.S.C. §§ 557-558 (1982).
41. Since rulemaking has some structure, it is not actually the lower bound since
some administriative actions are without any structure whatever. It is, however,
likely to be the pole with respect to any defined process since it is so flexible and has
many exceptions.
42. Along with the APA, administrative law texts tend to follow the rigid di-
chotomy and overlook the other processes.
43. While reading the definition of a rule (a statement of general or particular
applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law)
might reasonably lead one to believe that a permit is a rule (it is, of course, of particu-
lar applicability; it will take effect in the future; and it implements law) that is not
1983-84] 1401
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about the restrictions in the Chrysler loan guarantee or other subsi-
dies? What about all those conditions put in grants to states-such as
the 55 m.p.h. speed limit-that are every bit as coercive as a regula-
tion but outside the confines of the APA? How are agencies supposed
to make decisions such as whether to put roads in national forests, to
approve an environmental impact statement, or to approve a request
for a rent increase in subsidized housing? And, indeed, what of adju-
dication itself? The provisions of the APA are genuinely Byzantine.
But they apply only to the formal hearings presided over by adminis-
trative law judges. Other forms of hearings are not described. More-
over, the Departments of Labor and Health and Human Services
alone employ more than 800 administrative law judges and process
400,000 cases each year.4 4 The procedures which agencies actually
follow are far more diverse than those defined in the APA. They arise
through ad hoc judgments, are provided for in substantive statutes,
and are imposed by courts. Agencies have created a broad range of
alternative means of making the incredibly varied decisions the gov-
ernment is called on to make. It might help if we explicitly recog-
nized these alternatives. Perhaps the APA could be expanded to take
account of what is really happening, thereby consolidating our expe-
rience so that others could build on it.
We need also to build on the experience of others. We are gain-
ing insights into new forms of dispute resolution or, more accurately,
the application of dispute resolution techniques in new settings. A
literature is developing - this Symposium is part of it - on the sub-
ject, often along substantive lines. We need to take advantage of this
trend and marry that experience and understanding with the peculiar
needs of the administrative process.
These alternative techniques have been used in the administra-
tive process, and much more appears to be developing currently. But
no particular theory has developed as to how they should be used,
how they relate to the traditional processes, what forms of procedures
should be used to ensure that appropriate protections are afforded the
parties and the body politic, and what their advantages and disad-
vantages are in particular settings. Research on that front is in pro-
gress and our understanding will undoubtedly grow as our experience
does.
In the meantime, four areas of administrative procedure seem
the answer. See note 38 supra. The adjudicatory sections of the APA are not terribly
responsive to the needs here, however.
44. See generally Lubbers, Federal Administrative Law Judges: A Focus on Our Invisble
Judicary, 33 AD. L. REV. 109 (1981).
1402 [Vol. 29: p. 1393
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particularly in need of various means of dispute resolution that have
not been generally used in the administrative process, or at least are
not recognized as having been generally used.
III. NEEDS OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
Administrative law has been, as the saying goes with respect to
the states, a "laboratory" where many alternative procedures have
been created and experimented with, sometimes discarded and some-
times institutionalized. 45 But it has lagged behind the private sector
in its use and adaptation of the various forms of dispute resolution
that are being discussed at this Symposium. Happily, a number of
agencies are responding to the challenge and a considerable amount
of effort is going into looking at new ways of doing things.
We are on the verge of a new round of experimentation with
administrative procedure. 46 While the use and adaptation of these
dispute resolution mechanisms is needed across virtually the entire
span of administrative law, it seems convenient to break down the
analysis into four categories: rulemaking; agency adjudication; forms
of administrative decisions not specifically mentioned in the APA;
and dispute resolution mechanisms in the private sector that are used
in lieu of agency action or are required by agency action.
A. Rulemaking
The rulemaking provisions of the APA are remarkably sparse -
consult, draft, consult, publish. They were borne of a compromise
between those who favored very little restriction on an agency and
those who wanted everything done in trials.47 While an agency's du-
ties are few, the drafters clearly contemplated that more would be
45. See, e.g., Citizens for a Better Environment v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117, 1133-
34 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Wilkie, J., dissenting) (judicially created consent decree requir-
ing creation of new EPA programs should not be enforced because it limits the flexi-
bility of the EPA Administrator in making choices as to priorities, methods, and
allocation of resources), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2668 (1984).
46. It is interesting to note that in general over the past twenty-five years, Amer-
ican administrative law has become increasingly judicialized. Both its rulemaking
and adjudicatory procedures have become formal and more courtroom-like. Euro-
pean procedure, on the other hand, was more informal, contained more direct negoti-
ations among the major parties in interest but with little ability on the part of others
to sway the decisions, and hence relied more on the general political environment to
ensure decisions consistent with the public will. Recently, however, we have seen a
leavening of the American approach, with an increasing reliance on oversight, inter-
nal controls, and direct participation through informal means, while in Europe the
procedures are becoming increasingly structured. Thus, the two are converging.
47. See generally DAvis TEXT, supra note 4, at 9 (the 1946 enactment of the APA
was the result of a compromise between the plans proposed by the Administration
and the American Bar Association).
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done when necessary. 48 There would be two reasons for faith in the
resulting regulations: One theory had it that the agencies were "ex-
perts" and, in a technocratic way, could figure out how best to re-
spond to the situation at hand. 49 The second reason was that
agencies would operate comfortably within the confines of a political
consensus, so their actions could be judged directly against the pre-
vailing norms.50 Both theories broke down, however, as we moved
into the regulatory state. New regulations require enormous factual
material and as a result the expert model does not work terribly well:
indeed it has been repudiated in fact if not explicitly, although ves-
tiges clearly remain. 51 Few agencies enjoy a consensus as to their mis-
sion, and there is a strong feeling by many that the agency has an
independent agenda, although both sides tend to think it favors the
other. Thus, that too has waned as a justification for agency action.
The "hybrid rulemaking process" evolved to provide the missing
legitimacy. Although its details vary almost from proceeding to pro-
ceeding, its basic contours are that all interested parties have a right
to present facts and arguments to an agency under procedures
designed to test the underlying data and ensure the rationality of the
agency's decision;52 a court of appeals will then take a "hard look" at
the agency's action to ensure that the requirements have been met.
As a result, the focus is on narrowing the agency's discretion by con-
trolling the record, and hence the fight over the record becomes par-
ticularly bitter and adversarial.
But while the factual basis of a rule is unquestionably important,
there generally is no purely rational answer or response to it. Rather,
at bottom the resulting rule is a political choice that reconciles a host
48. The Supreme Court has made clear that the choice as to whether to invoke
the additional procedures belongs to the agency, not a court or any private party. See
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435
U.S. 519, 524 (1978).
49. See Stewart, supra note 19, at 1274.
50. Id. Perhaps the prime example of this was the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). While there may have been differences of opinion at the fringes,
there appeared to be general consensus on its mission, both as to what conduct in the
private sector was and was not acceptable and how the agency was to go about polic-
ing unacceptable conduct. The SEC was, during that time, widely credited with be-
ing the "best" agency. Now that the Commission has ventured into new and
controversial areas such as corporate governance, that consensus has broken down
and attacks are common.
51. For a discussion of the breakdown of the "agency as expert" model of ad-
ministrative law, see Comment, An Alternative to the Traditional Rulemaktig Process: A
Case Study of Negotiation in the Development of Regulations, 29 Vii[,. L. REV. 1505 (1984).
52. While anyone can, of course, submit comments in response to a notice of
proposed rulemaking, only interested parties can participate in this process fully by
invoking the aid of courts or forcing participation in agency hearings.
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of competing values or interests. Usually the way to legitimize such a
political choice is through a legislative process in which representa-
tives of those affected would meet to reach an appropriate resolu-
tion.53 Thus, it appears appropriate to look for a process that is
modeled more on the legislature than on the judiciary: regulations
developed by those substantially affected would have a political legit-
imacy beyond that of the hybrid rulemaking process. The Adminis-
trative Conference of the United States has recommended that
agencies experiment with negotiating regulations directly among the
interests that would be substantially affected. 54 The conditions that
are hospitable for using direct negotiations are:
1. There are a limited number of interests that will be significantly
affected, and they are such that individuals can be selected to repre-
sent them; a rule of thumb is that fifteen is a practical limit on the
number of people who participate at any one time;55
2. The issues are ripe and mature for decision; 56
3. The resolution of the issues presented will not require any interest
to compromise a fundamental tenet or value, since agreement on that
is unlikely;57
4. There is a reasonable deadline for the action so that unless the
53. The historical method of legitimizing a political choice was through the leg-
islative process. The Founding Fathers of the United States created a "representive
democracy" as a mechanism to reconcile the competing political values and to legiti-
mize the choice which the legislature would make between those values. See generally
G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 58-59 (1969)
(direct election of the representatives of the people rendered America's government a
form of representation ingrafted upon democracy).
54. Administrative Conference of the United States Recommendation No. 82-4,
1 C.F.R. § 305.82-4 (1984). The following discussion of negotiating rules is a synthe-
sis of the discussion in the report upon which the Administrative Conference of the
United States based its recommendation. See Harter, supra note 37; see generally Com-
ment, supra note 51, at 1513-35 (discussing Mr. Harter's proposal for negotiating rules
and summarizing a comparative case study of rules of regulations which involved
extensive public participation without using Mr. Harter's negotiation format).
55. Harter, supra note 37, at 46. But see Comment, supra note 51, at 1535-36 & n.
118 (a 15-person limit is too inflexible; the focus should be on representation of all
important interests at negotiations).
56. Harter, supra note 37, at 47. An issue may not be ready for resolution be-
cause of lack of information, because the interests involved in its resolution are unas-
certainable, or because the parties involved are still "jockeying for position." Id
57. Id. at 49-50. No party is likely to compromise something it regards as funda-
mental or an article of faith. Thus, for example, it is not likely that one could have
reached agreement on the role of costs in an Occupational Safety and Health Admin-
istration health regulation since industry and labor had fundamentally different
views on the matter and it was central to how future standards would be developed.
Now that the Supreme Court has wrestled with the issue and, even if not resolving it,
has put boundaries on the matter, standards may be able to be negotiated. Id (citing
Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 639 (1980)).
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parties reach an agreement, someone else will impose the decision; 58
5. There are sufficiently many and diverse issues that the parties can
rank them according to their own needs and priorities; 59
6. There is sufficient countervailing power so that no party is in a
position to dictate the result; 60
7. Participants view it as in their interest to use the process as op-
posed to the traditional one; 6 1 and
8. The agency is willing to use the process and will appoint a senior
staff member to represent it.62
The process envisions that a neutral third party would contact
the various parties to review the issues posed by the proposed regula-
tion and determine whether there are additional parties that should
be represented in discussions. If the conditions are met, the agency
would publish a notice in the Federal Register announcing its intention
to develop the proposed rule in this way and inviting parties who are
not represented to come forward. It would then empanel the group
as an advisory committee. 63 Its charge would be to develop a consen-
58. Id at 47-48. Some party is likely to profit from delay, and because no inter-
est is likely to be willing to invest the time and energy in discussions until it is neces-
sary, a reasonable deadline for action is very helpful. The parties will then know that
delay will be greeted with a loss of control or some unacceptable cost. Id
59. Id at 50. What may be very important to one party may not be that impor-
tant to others. One of the major benefits of the discussions is that the parties can
address the issues directly and attempt to maximize the overall return - against the
backdrop of the statute, which defines the national interest, and precedent - by
adjusting the reponse to the various issues. A single, bipolar choice is not the stuff of
negotiations. Id
60. Id at 45. One of the major incentives for direct discussions is that parties are
otherwise at loggerheads and cannot move without incurring an unacceptable cost.
Some parties may gain the power to inflict that cost solely through traditional proce-
dures. In that case, the situation must be carefully reviewed to see if the threat of
invoking that process is sufficient to empower the party to negotiate, or whether using
the alternative process would disenfranchise them. In short, without countervailing
power at the table, the process could be badly abused. Id.
61. Id at 43. If parties do not view the process as in their overall interest, it is not
likely that discussions will be productive. Thus, it may be inappropriate to say simply
that the rule will be developed this way and if anyone wants to participate they must
do so in this way. On the other hand, if a process is started, parties frequently will
come and participate fully even if they would have advocated it at the outset. Id.
62. Id at 51. But see Comment, supra note 51, at 1536-37 (agency should be
represented by middle-level employees in addition to senior staff members). An
agency that is not in favor of this process can always find creative ways to sabotage it.
Moreover, experience shows rather vividly that if the agency itself does not partici-
pate or have some other intimate connection to it, the fruits of the discussions are
highly likely to be rejected or atrophy for lack of attention through the "not invented
here" syndrome. Harter, supra note 37, at 51.
63. An advisory committee would have to be empanelled in order to comply
with the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-15 (1982). An advisory
committee exists whenever a committee, conference, panel, or similar group is con-
vened in order to render advice to the President or an agency. H.R. REP. No. 1017,
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sus on a proposed rule and supporting preamble. "Consensus" in this
context means that no interest that is represented dissents from the
recommendation. 64 This is necessary so that no interest loses power it
might otherwise have through the traditional process. Note also that
an individual might object, but overall the interest as a whole does
not.65 It may be, of course, that the group is not able to reach agree-
ment on a particular recommendation, but the discussions reveal a
"region" or area within which the parties can "live with the result."
In that case, the recommendation would be that agency arbitrate
among the interests by developing the rule within those boundaries.
The agency would agree to use the results as the basis of its pro-
posed rule unless something were quite wrong with them. That is
appropriate because a senior agency official presumably concurred in
the result, and he should have received the appropriate internal clear-
ances before doing so. Thus, the agreement is not alien to the agency.
The group is likely to want such assurance before it will be willing to
incur the time, expense, and anguish of reaching an agreement, lest
its work simply be disregarded.66 The agency might wish to append
its own comments on the proposal to flesh out public response, but it
should clearly delineate between that which is its and that which re-
flected the consensus of the group. The agency would then subject
the proposal to the normal rulemaking process and would, of course,
modify the proposal in response to meritorious comments. 67
Several agencies have started using the process. The Depart-
ment of Transportation recently announced that it planned to use it
to revise its rule concerning pilots' flight duty status time.68 The rule
had proved particularly intractable, and the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration had tried several times to revise it, only to be blocked by
one interest or another. The existing rule had generated more re-
quests for interpretations than any other, with the result being that
the rule was supplemented by over 1,000 pages of agency comments.
Nineteen parties69 started the process on June 29, 198370 and held
92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3491, 3492-
94.
64. See Harter, supra note 37, at 92-97.
65. Id
66. Id. at 99-102; Harter, The Political Legitimacy andJudicial Review of Consensual
Rules, 32 AM. U.L. REv. 471, 480 (1983).
67. Harter, supra note 37, at 100-02.
68. Notice of Intent to Form Advisory Committee for Regulatory Negotiation,
48 Fed. Reg. 21,339 (1983).
69. Notice of Establishment of Advisory Committee, 48 Fed. Reg. 29,771,
29,772 (1983). The original advisory committee was made up of representatives from
the FAA, National Air Carrier Association, National Air Transportation Association,
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seven meetings71 over an eight month period.
The group was not able to reach a consensus on a single propo-
sal, but it did hold thorough and productive sessions. Based on those
discussions, the FAA drafted a proposal that was reviewed by the
group, which concurred that it should be published as a notice of
proposed rulemaking. At this time, it is too early to tell whether the
discussions will lead to a rule which is acceptable to the parties that
participated in the discussions, as well as any who did not
participate. 72
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
undertook a "feasibility analysis" to determine whether it would be
appropriate to use the process for the development of its standard on
the occupational exposure to benzene.73 Following discussions with
the interested parties, it appeared that the above conditions were met
particularly well. The only possible difficulty was that a great deal of
emotional commitment was attached to the standard because of the
regulation's history and, since OSHA had announced that it wanted
a draft standard within only a few months, there was likely not
enough time to use the process. But, since the criteria appeared to be
met and it appeared that the parties did in fact have a great deal to
discuss, a preliminary meeting was held to determine if it would be
fruitful to hold further, informal discussions to the end of developing
a consensus on the contours of a standard. The group decided that
such meetings would be fruitful, and several informal discussions were
held. 4 The meetings thoroughly explored the parties' needs and con-
cerns and alternative ways of meeting them. The parties came very
Air Line Pilots Association, Flight Engineers International Association, Alaska Air
Carriers Association, Aviation Consumer Action Project, Air Transport Association,
Regional Airline Association, Helicopter Association International, Pan American
World Airways, People's Express, New York Air, Southwest Airlines, DHL Cargo,
and International Brotherhood of Teamsters. Id
70. Id
71. The advisory committee met seven times between June 29, 1983 and Febru-
ary 14, 1984, for a total of seventeen days. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 49 Fed.
Reg. 12,136, 12,137-38 (1984).
72. See id. (publication of proposed regulation); Advzsoy Committee Supports FAA
Draftfor Plot Time Rules, AVIATION WEEK SPACE TEcH., March 12, 1984, at 194.
73. See generally Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S.
607 (1980) (rule promulgated by OSHA to replace national consensus standard for
occupational exposure to benzene held invalid). The API case opened the door for
negotiation of a new benzene regulation. See id.
74. Failure of Mediation Group to Agree Will Not Delay Rulemaking, OSHA Says, 7
CHEMICAL REG. REP. (BNA) 1696 (1984). OSHA did not participate in the discus-
sions, but expressed its support for them and its interest in using their fruits. OSHA
continued to develop its own proposal in-house, and hence would have been in a
position to judge rather immediately the merits of any proposal that might have
emerged. Id
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close to a consensus 75 but enough issues separated them that discus-
sions have been adjourned.7 6 It seems clear that the group got farther
than virtually anyone thought they would over so controversial a reg-
ulation, and there was consensus that it had been a productive, re-
warding experience. As with the FAA rule, only time will tell
whether the discussions have a direct and wholesome effect on the
development of a standard. 77
Although thus far there are no clear success stories that have
gone all the way to a consensus on a proposed rule and supporting
preamble, it appears that regulatory negotiation offers significant ad-
vantages. It enables the parties to address the issues directly and to
explore them in a detail that is impossible in the hybrid process. That
its first two uses addressed enormously controversial and complex is-
sues also attests to its ability to breach previously unresolvable differ-
ences between the parties. As will be discussed below, these two
experiences will likely pave the way for future uses, precisely because
future parties can be more comfortable with using a "known" process
and not worry about the vagaries of the unknown.78
B. Adjudicat1'on79
The APA defines the adjudication procedure only for those adju-
catory proceedings "required by statute to be determined on the rec-
ord after opportunity for an agency hearing," except in certain
75. Id. The participants were representatives of the Chemical Manufacturers
Association, the Rubber Manufacturers Association, the American Iron and Steel
Institute, the American Petroleum Institute, the AFL-CIO, the United Steelworkers
of America, the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers International Union, and the
United Rubber Workers. Id.
76. Id.
77. Mr. Doug Clark, special assistant to the OSHA Administrator, commented
that the discussions between labor and industry will result in "a strong standard for
worker protection" when the benzene standard goes into effect. Id
One benefit that is likely to come from the experience is that it served to break
the ground for the actual use of the process; doing so entails a new way of looking at
regulatory questions that can pose practical problems for the participants. For exam-
ple, it requires the parties to actually address what they want or need and to bear the
responsibility for the decisions that are made. It is often far easier simply to blame a
recalcitrant agency for "not understanding" than to decide what is appropriate. The
representatives and the parties confronted this difficulty with admirable energy and
ability. That will likely serve as the foundation for future efforts.
78. See generally Comment, supra note 51.
79. The preceding section on rulemaking was developed extensively both
because research on it has been completed and because the newly. recommended
procedures are beginning to be used. The sections that follow will be more
abbreviated and raise more questions than they put to rest. That is because research
in this area is only now beginning for the Administrative Conference of the United
States in conjunction with the Department of Justice.
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specified instances.8 0 That limitation notwithstanding, agencies in
fact provide a wide variety of hearings and a substantial literature has
developed analyzing the range of procedures."1 Much of the analysis
was generated in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Goldberg
v. Kely,82 in which the Court analyzed the minimal qualities a hear-
ing must have to pass constitutional muster prior to the termination
of welfare benefits. The Court demonstrated the paucity of the legal
approach by showing a mindset that the only satisfactory way to do
something is to emulate courts: while it denied it was requiring a for-
mal hearing, it required most of the attributes of a Perry Mason
trial. 3 The concern is not so much for the burden the court imposes,
which is very likely substantial, but for the irrelevance of its dictates
to solving the problem, and its insensitivity for the long run conse-
quences. Happily, the case has not been followed rigorously. 4
As a result, it is appropriate to ask two questions: what kind of
proceedings can be provided that meet the constitutional require-
ments for "some kind of hearing"8' 5 and, perhaps more importantly for
our purposes, what sort of hearings can be offered as a voluntary al-
80. 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1982). Section 554(a) provides in pertinent part:
(a) This section applies, according to the provisions thereof, in every case of
adjudication required by statute to be determined on the record after op-
portunity for an agency hearing, except to the extent that there is involved
(1) a matter subject to a subsequent trial of the law and the facts de
novo in a court.
Id
81. See Friendly, "Some Kind of a Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975);
Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REV. 185 (1974).
82. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). The issue in Goldberg was "whether a State that termi-
nates public assistance payments to a particular recipient without affording him the
opportunity for an evidentiary hearing prior to termination denies the recipient pro-
cedural due process in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." Id at 255. The Court held that the recipient should have been afforded
"timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a proposed termination, and an
effective opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse witnesses and by present-
ing his own arguments and evidence orally." Id at 267-68.
83. Id
84. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). In Mathews, the Court ex-
plained that the nature of the required hearing could be determined by balancing
the need for accuracy against the magnitude of the deprivation and the burden it
would impose on the system in which the hearing is being held. Id at 339-49. It may
have reached its decision more by an ad hoc determination of the comparative mag-
nitude of the deprivation of losing welfare rights as opposed to disability rights. Id at
340-43.
85. See Friendly, supra note 81, at 1267. Judge Friendly explained that the ex-
pression "some kind of hearing" is "drawn from an opinion by Mr. Justice White
... .He stated, 'The Court has consistently held that some kind of hearing is required
at some time before a person is finally deprived of his property interests.' " Id. (quot-
ing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974)) (emphasis added by Judge
Friendly).
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ternative to more formal means. While, to be sure, agencies have
used informal "modified hearings" for decades, given the current in-
terest and the growth of experience with alternative means of dispute
resolution, it is appropriate to ask when they can be used and how
they need to be adapted to meet the dictates of the administrative
process.
It is also necessary to ask whether any sort of process, in the form
of an adaptation of trial-type hearings, is the appropriate response to
achieving the desired goals. No one would seriously contend that a
disagreement over how much postage should be placed on a package
should be made by means of a trial. Rather, the better solution is
likely to be some sort of "quality control" mechanism to ensure that
the bureaucratic decisions are made with acceptable accuracy. Thus,
as in any other dispute, the nature of the issue in question must be
analyzed before the appropriate method for addressing it can be
designed.8 6
A range of techniques might be used to provide alternatives to
traditional forms of agency adjudication.
Mediation.8 7 The decision that needs to be made may be quite
appropriate for mediation or direct negotiations among the affected
parties. The criteria that are described above can also be used to
determine whether the issues would be suitable. The one major dif-
ference between negotiation and mediation in the administrative pro-
cess and their private counterpart is that for at least some types of
decision, the parties themselves cannot dispose of the issue but, rather,
additional procedures may be necessary. It may be, for example, that
agency officials who have the ultimate decisional authority are not
present, or that the decision must be reconciled with existing public
policy and hence subject to review by someone, or that the decision
may affect other members of the public in such a way that they have
the right to participate somehow in the decision before it is final.
Thus, before undertaking discussions, the parties must analyze every-
86. See Mashaw, Administrative Due Process.- The Quest Jbr a D'gnatagy Theoly, 61
B.U.L. REV. 885 (1981).
87. One authority has described the role of a mediator as follows:
A mediator is an impartial outsider who tries to aid the negotiators in
their quest to find a compromise agreement. The mediator can help with
the negotiation process, but he does not have the authority to dictate a
solution. He might not even choose to suggest a final solution; rather, his
purpose is to lead the negotiators to determine whether there exist com-
promises that would be preferred by each party to the no agreement alter-
native, and to help the parties select on their own a mutually acceptable
agreement.
H. RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 23 (1982) (emphasis omitted).
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thing that must be done before a final decision can be reached and
what the likelihood is that their efforts could be derailed before frui-
tion. That analysis would include factors such as the participation of
others after the agreement is reached 8 or disapproval by agency offi-
cials who did not participate. Mediation and negotiation in this con-
text constitute a recognition that the great bulk of administrative
hearings are settled, just like their civil counterparts. What is needed
is to recognize and encourage the use of mediation as a means of fos-
tering settlement.
Arbitration.8 9 Arbitration is widely used in the private sector for a
variety of subjects. 90 Several agencies and programs are beginning to
use variants of it instead of formal administrative hearings. For ex-
ample, the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) began offering it
as an alternative means of hearing appeals from adverse action deter-
minations against government employees.9' The Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC) has just inaugurated a program of ar-
bitration for customer claims of $15,000 or less. 92 Arbitration is also
used in resolutions of disputes under the Superfund, 93 disputes involv-
ing patent issues,94 disputes in age discrimination cases,95 and for de-
termining the payments from users of pesticide data. 96
These programs typically use regular presiding officers as the ar-
bitrators and, unlike traditional arbitration, the parties are not able
88. For example, the Occupational Safety and Health Review Board can disap-
prove an agreement entered into between OSHA and a company that settles a cita-
tion issued by OSHA for violation of a standard.
89. Professor Raiffa has described the role of an arbitrator as follows:
An arbitrator (or arbiter), after hearing the arguments and proposals
of all sides and after finding out "the facts," may also [like the mediator] try
to lead the negotiators to devise their own solutions or may suggest reason-
able solutions; but if these preliminary actions fail, the arbitrator has the
authority to impose a solution. The negotiators might voluntarily submit
their dispute for arbitration, or the arbitration might be imposed on them
by some higher authority.
H. RAIFFA, supra note 87, at 23 (emphasis omitted).
90. See Perritt, supra note 9, at 1266-70.
91. Merit Systems Production Board: Practices and Procedures, 5 C.F.R.
§§ 1201.200-.221 (1984).
92. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 180.1-.6 (1983).
93. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9612(b)(4) (1982).
94. See 35 U.S.C. § 135 (1982); 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.201-.288 (1984).
95. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission - Procedure - Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1626.15-.16 (1983).
96. See Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C.
§ 136a(c)(1)(D)(ii) (1982). The constitutionality of this provision has recently been
upheld as a taking for public use. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 S. Ct. 2862,
2882-83 (1984).
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to select the arbitrator from among a panel of candidates offered by
some third party. The decisions are based on agency precedent but
are not themselves precedential in any way. The cases which use ar-
bitration procedures are those where time is quite important to at
least one party,97 and no complex factual or policy issues are
presented. They are generally based on some sort of discovery or
other method of requiring the parties to tender relevant data, not in
exhaustive detail but at least sufficient for decision. The arbitrator's
decision may be, as in the case of the CFTC, simply an award98 or, as
in the case of the MSPB, a brief recitation of findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The agency itself has limited review authority,
but even if it does not reverse the arbitrator's decision, it may not
necessarily mean the agency agrees with the result. The review is
summary, akin to the judicial review of an arbitration award, except
that the agency will also look for gross errors in applying agency pre-
cedent. The full nature of judicial review has yet to be developed: to
the extent the award becomes an agency "order," it is subject to judi-
cial review under the Administrative Procedure Act. Just what sort
of review that is to be and the record on which the court would base
its review has yet to be developed. 99 In short, this area of administra-
tive law is only beginning. It may be, however, that when all is said
and done, it may substantially resemble some procedures that have
been around a long time. Even if that is the case, the area will profit
from sights gained by private sector experience.
Minitrials.'°0 The minitrial that has been developed for commer-
cial litigation, in which the lawyers for the opposing sides present
summaries of their cases in the presence of representatives of the par-
ties who are authorized to negotiate a settlement of the dispute, has
been used successfully in an enormously complex contract dispute
97. That only one of the parties is in a hurry for resolution can present problems
when both parties must consent to using the process, since the other one will often
profit from delay and is not likely to consent to the process. In some cases, however,
the parties would simply like to get the matter resolved, and hence both would agree.
The question of whether one party can force the other into use of the process, or
whether the forum agency can direct that it be used, needs to be explored.
98. One reason for this is that a decision might have collateral effects, and it was
thought that avoiding them might make the process attractive to some parties that
would otherwise profit from delay.
99. To the extent the parties agree to the process, just as in private sector arbi-
tration, a limited form of judicial review may be appropriate on the ground that the
parties made the choice that it was in their overall interest to use the process and
hence should not complain if they lose. If, however, the process is forced on a party, a
different standard might apply.
100. See Lambros, The Judge's Role in Fostering Voluntar
, 
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with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.' 0 ' Consid-
erable work is now being done on the application of the technique to
more routine - but nonetheless complex - disputes that are heard
before the Defense Department's Board of Contract Appeals.
Although not quite administrative adjudication, the Department of
Justice was reviewing the minitrial's applicability in settling litigation
over contract claims in lieu of full trials before the courts. Interest-
ingly, however, the government may be prohibited from entering into
an arbitration agreement to resolve its controversies because it is pro-
hibited from relying on arbitration to resolve claims involving ques-
tions of legal liability. 102
C. Other Forms of Admi'slrative Action
While the APA, and hence the legal writing, focuses virtually
exclusively on rulemaking and adjudication, there are many other
types of agency decisions, and many of them could be improved by
invoking the ADR experience. For example, the staff of the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission regularly acts as a quasi-mediator
among competing factions over environmental conditions that are
placed on low-head hydroelectric plants.'0 3 Agencies have entered
into mediation over a range of other decisions involving issues such as
the protection of endangered species or the technologies required to
meet standards issued under the Clean Air Act. i04
What is needed for this category of decisions is a recognition of
the availability of techniques that may be used by agencies to reach
far more satisfactory decisions than would be possible if the agency
arrogated them to itself.
101. Johnson, Masri & Oliver, Minitrtal Successfuly Resolves NASA-TRW Dispute,
Legal Times, Sept. 6, 1982, at 13, col. 1.
102. See 31 U.S.C. § 1346 (1982). This section prohibits the government from
expending public funds for the work of any commission, council, board or similar
group not authorized by law. The Comptroller General has opined that this section
prohibits the government from entering into arbitration agreements to resolve ques-
tions involving the rights of the United States, absent express authorization. 8 Op.
Comp. Gen. 96 (1928); 7 Op. Comp. Gen. 541 (1928). However, this bar does not
prevent the government from entering into arbitration agreements for the purposes of
determining a factual question of reasonable value, which does not impose any obli-
gation on the government and does not leave "questions of legal liability" for deter-
mination by arbitrators. 20 Op. Comp. Gen. 95, 99 (1940); 22 Op. Comp. Gen. 140
(1942).
103. See Kerwin, Environmental Analysi' in Hydropower Licensing. A Modelfor Deci-
sionmaking, ENVTL. IMPAcT ASSESSMENT REV., June 1983, at 131, 134.
104. See Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability Problem, 6 VT. L.
REV. 1, 2 n.6 (1981)
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D. Alternatives in Lieu of Agency Action
Section II of this paper argued that much of modern regulation
can be viewed as a combination of a failure of substantive standards
by which to judge conduct and, perhaps even more importantly, the
lack of a suitable mechanism by which rights can be enforced. Profes-
sor Perritt's hapless student is a perfect example.10 5 When confronted
with defects in a new car, he sought to enforce his right under the
warranties against its manufacturer; he even invoked the dispute reso-
lution mechanism created for this purpose by the auto company and
the Better Business Bureau, but it was unavailing. Without satisfac-
tion, he had to begin to build power, and that was successful only
through the invocation of litigation. Coercion won out.
The question here is, what if the student were not a law student
itching for some practical experience but rather someone for whom
the prospect of litigation would be expensive, 0 6 emotionally wrench-
ing, 0 7 and time consuming? The likely reponse would be: nothing, at
least nothing short of a few letters and some frustration. If that is the
case, then the lack of a dispute resolution mechanism (DRM) leads to
a quasi-externality in which the buyer, who may have reasonably ex-
pected a product free of defects or the need of repair, must absorb the
resulting costs. The classic response to that is regulation - an agency
will prescribe conduct and prosecute violations. 08 Thus there is a
clear trade-off between a reasonable, responsive DRM and regula-
tion. If the arbitration program that the student used had teeth' 0 9
and the arbitrator was a reponsible neutral party, the issue may well
have been defused. The company would likely have corrected the
difficulties instead of dallying, since it too would likely want to avoid
105. See Perritt, supra note 9, at 1223-24.
106. The transaction costs of bringing a lawsuit against an auto company to
force the repair of a defective automobile would likely exceed the value of the defects
themselves. Thus, unless some statute, regulation, or common law precept provided
for a shifting of the fees, the consumer might decide not to bring the litigation. Even
if the American rule were abrogated, the consumer would still face the gamble of
whether the claim was sufficiently meritorious to merit the award of fees.
107. The plethora of currently popular books on assertiveness and winning
through intimidation must surely reflect a timidity on the part of most individuals
when faced with having to pursue something they believe is rightfully theirs in the
face of either indifference or hostility.
108. See notes 3-5 & 31-32 and accompanying text supra.
109. It should be noted that in fact many of the arbitration/mediation pro-
grams for auto warranties are binding on the auto company. See Brenner, Dispute
Resolution Movement Gathers Momentum, Legal Times, Mar. 21, 1983, at 27, col. 1. How
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the costs of subsequent proceedings and the ill-will generated by an
unpopular result.
As a result of all of this, one of the areas of administrative law
that deserves careful attention is the establishment of private sector
DRM's as a substitute for agency regulation or hearings. Several pro-
grams, for example, either require or permit private organizations to
establish a forum for reviewing complaints or other issues that arise
with respect to some particular activity.' 10 If more of such programs
are not created, the government agencies will have to play a larger
role in resolving contests.
The use of DRM's is also likely to be an important aspect of
proposals for "self-regulation." It is not enough simply for companies
to argue that they are taking appropriate action "voluntarily," and
hence there is no need for government intervention, unless there is a
correlative right on the part of the beneficiaries of that action to en-
force it in some manner. In some cases, of course, that will be
through market transactions, but in others some sort of DRM will be
needed to ensure that the promised actions, as in Professor Perritt's
example, are discharged.
The pressing questions, then, are what should the characteristics
of those DRM's be and what relationship will they have to the
agency? How, for example, do you ensure neutrality? How coercive
is the decision to be, and on whom? Is the DRM's use mandatory on
the consumer? May a "defendant" decline its use, and, if so, with
what result? What sort of due process rights are provided the con-
sumer and the company against whom an order might run? What
appeal rights are there and to what body - higher private sector
authority, the agency, or a court? Is deference given the DRM's deci-
sions or is there de novo review? How expensive will it be? How
much will the reviewing authority be bound by precedent and how
much will it seek justice under the circumstances? We will need to
develop guidelines and insights into this emerging area. That will
entail defining the procedures, or general principles, that are to be
used in embedded dispute resolution mechanisms that will be suffi-
cient to ward off government action.I' The Federal Trade Commis-
110. See, e.g., Securities Industry Conference in Arbitration, Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 13,470 (Apr. 26, 1977); Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 2310 (1982).
111. The violation of the minimal rules of procedure could result either in the
agency's resolving the underlying dispute or the agency taking action against the
organization that was supposedly responsible for compliance with the general proce-
dures. While invalidated under the statute under which it operated, the Federal
Trade Commission took this approach in the vocational school rule when it imposed
requirements that were prescribed for the purpose of preventing unfair practice, and
[Vol. 29: p. 13931416
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sion has taken an initial step in this direction. Under the Magnuson-
Moss Warranty Act, warrantors that incorporate a dispute settlement
program must comply with the standards for those programs that the
Commission has defined in its Rule on Informal Dispute Settlement
Procedures." 2 Another example is the self-policing rules of the stock
exchanges." 3 They operate under the supervision of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, but with relative autonomy provided the
procedural standards are met.
IV. THE FUTURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
The future of the use of alternative means of dispute resolution
- or, if the term "dispute" or "conflict" is somehow inappropriate, of
alternative ways of resolving issues that are complex and affect several
parties - by the government appears promising. But it will not come
automatically, and several hurdles exist that need to be addressed.
A. Familiarity
Undoubtedly the greatest need is simply to generate familiarity
with the attributes of the range of alternative procedures. Agencies,
like most people, are likely to be a little leery of unknown processes.
As such, they would be unable to determine whether it would be in
their interest to use them. Moreover, agencies always run the risk of
judicial and congressional oversight, so they must also be confident
that the new processes meet the demands placed on them from the
outside.
This will come from several sources. First, it is always helpful if a
complete model is created and analyzed so the agency can determine
whether it meets its needs, and doing so removes some of the fear of
the unknown. Second, the experience of other agencies is invaluable
because it reduces the risk of developing a new approach. Third, the
growing acceptance and experience in the private sector will lap over
into the administrative process. That is clearly what is happening
was prepared to treat a violation of those requirements as an unfair trade practice per
se. See Katherine Gibbs School, Inc. v. FTC, 612 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1979). For further
discussion of the Katherbie Gibbs decision, see note 21 and accompanying text supra.
General Motors Corporation recently entered into a consent decree with the
Federal Trade Commission over the repair and replacement of defective engines. The
decree provides for a system of arbitration, which is binding on GM to determine the
extent of liability and the repairs to be performed. This dispute resolution mecha-
nism was accepted in the face of those who argued for more stringent mandatory
actions. See General Motors Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 22,010 (1983).
112. 16 C.F.R. § 703 (1984).
113. See Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
14171983-841
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with the minitrial, for example. 1 4 Fourth, it will come simply
through talk and through discussions, such as this Symposium.' 1 5
B. Particular Needs
The government also has some particular needs that must be ad-
dressed in some manner.
1. Negotiatton/Mediatt'on
There is sometimes a peculiar problem that arises when the gov-
ernment reaches a decision by negotiation with the interested parties
or, worse, with only some of them. The integrity of the negotiation
process is generally assured by the self-interest of each party: no one
will agree unless they think they are better off for doing so, as com-
pared with the available alternatives. But it is not always clear just
what the government's interest is, and someone could be accused of
selling out its substantive interest to gain some other benefit, such as
political favors or a new job for the bureaucrat. In the abstract such
motives may be impossible to detect, and hence any government offi-
cial who participates in the negotiations may be vulnerable to wholly
baseless attacks. Thus, a timid official may be reluctant to risk that
exposure. As a result, it may be necessary in some programs to create
a mechanism to protect the integrity of negotiated decisions. That
could come through a board of senior officials that reviews settle-
ments,1 16 a structured settlement process, publication of a proposed
settlement and its supporting reasons for comment, 117 or some other
mechanism.
2. Acceptance
Some officials are likely to resist the use of some of the alterna-
tives on the grounds that they are inconsistent with the agency's role
as the sovereign. That is especially the case with respect to mediation
and negotiation, although it would also likely apply in arbitration. In
the case of mediation/negotiation, the agency is more likely to have
114. See Johnson, Masri & Oliver, supra note 101, at 13.
115. For example, one government official had been skeptical about some of the
alternative processes, but decided to accept their merit because they were frequently
discussed with seeming approval by a variety of well-respected individuals and
interests.
116. The Attorney General must approve all tort claims settlements of litigation
that are worth more than $25,000. Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671
(1982).
117. The Federal Trade Commission publishes consent decrees for comment in
the Federal Register.
1418 [Vol. 29: p. 1393
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only an illusion of sovereignty rather than sovereignty itself. That
results from a confusion of the authority to take some action with the
power to do so. The reason negotiation may be an attractive alterna-
tive is precisely because of the countervailing power that others have.
For example, an agency may unquestionably have the authority to
issue a rule but its efforts to do so can be frustrated by others. ' 8
Thus, direct discussions may not be an abdication of authority or sov-
ereignty but a very real way of furthering the agency's interest: it will
continue to represent whatever interest it represents in traditional
proceedings but is now in a position to gain information and accept-
ance of a mutually developed approach. Since the parties in interest
concur in it, they are also more likely to be satisfied with the result
and comply. But that reluctance to yield some perceived power must
be overcome.
3. Institutionalization
Premature institutionalization through codification or rigid re-
quirements should undoubtedly be avoided, although there may well
be pressure to do so. We clearly need time to experiment and get
comfortable with the process. But, once we have some understanding
of suitable approaches, some sort of institutionalization could be
quite helpful in overcoming the difficulties discussed above.
V. CONCLUSION
In short, the future of alternative means of dispute resolution in
the administrative process would appear to be strong. Indeed, the
two have a long and complex history. Moreover, the needs of the
administrative process have never been greater: to cope with massive
caseloads; to develop new alternatives to coercive regulation; and to
resolve enormously complex litigation.1 9 The means of resolving is-
sues that are currently under discussion hold a significant promise for
the administrative process.
118. For a particular example of this, see text accompanying notes 68-69 supra.
119. One can only imagine the enormous complexity that will be involved in
litigation over the failure of two communication satellites that were unsuccessfully
launched from the space shuttle. A controversy of similar complexity, indeed also
involving satellites, was resolved through the use of a minitrial. Johnson, Masri &
Oliver, supra note 101. Whether an alternative approach is merited in these instances,
it is clear that the complexity of the issues presented are at an all time high, both in
their technology and, when considering the social issues involved in government dis-
putes, in their demography.
14191983-84]
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